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MOVING BEYOND ‘THERAPY’ AND ‘ENHANCEMENT’ IN THE ETHICS OF GENE
EDITING
Bryan Cwik
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Abstract: Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations (and trepidations)
about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have
been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream (or
nightmare) of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made
enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to
determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context—germline
intervention in reproductive medicine—issues about enhancement and eugenics are, for the
foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a
different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such
as intelligence, and there are more pressing (and unresolved) questions that need attention if
clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility.
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MOVING BEYOND ‘THERAPY’ AND ‘ENHANCEMENT’ IN THE ETHICS OF GENE
EDITING

1. Introduction
Discussion of the ethics of gene editing is haunted by the specter of biomedical enhancement. In
one of the earliest papers on the subject, Leon Kass wrote that, regardless of clinical potential,
gene editing raised profound ethical conundrums as “Genetic engineering...will be able to create
new capacities, and hence establish new norms of health and fitness.”1 A huge literature has
developed on the use of gene editing for purposes of biomedical enhancement, with passionate
defenses of its potential and equally passionate criticisms of its potential harms.2 Even as
research has progressed in different directions, much, if not most, work on gene editing in
philosophical bioethics continues to focus on enhancement, including a number of articles in a
recent special issue of this journal devoted to the topic.3 In a another recent paper on the topic,
the authors affirmed that “Of greatest concern is editing of genes to confer advantageous traits
not related to avoiding disease or preserving health.”4 Most statements on the use of gene editing
in human beings so far from professional organizations, ethics boards, and advisory panels—
including the recent exhaustive report by the United States National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine—have called for drawing the line at “therapeutic” uses and
forbidding “enhancement” with gene editing, thus reaffirming the centrality of the distinction.5
The importance of enhancement for the ethics of gene editing is especially relevant for
neuroethics. Though much of the discussion in neuroethics about enhancement is about methods
such as pharmacological intervention,6 the potential for genetic enhancement of cognitive
abilities is considered to pose a significant ethical issue for gene editing.7 The potential for
enhancing cognitive abilities thus raises a particularly high bar for any clinical applications of

2

gene editing that could affect, directly or inadvertently, neural development. There is possibly no
place where the difference between therapeutic and enhancing uses of gene editing is more
ethically important than where editing could affect neural development and psychological traits.
Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations (and trepidations) about
the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been
sky high. These expectations, however, have gone largely unfulfilled. The ability to eliminate all
inherited diseases, choose traits, and make ourselves stronger, faster, and smarter does not appear
to be in our foreseeable future. But though the dream (or nightmare) of being able to control our
biology is still a ways off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential
clinical uses in reproductive medicine. My aim in this paper is to argue that debates about
enhancement are of limited value in dealing with questions about foreseeable clinical uses of
germline gene editing. This is for two reasons. First, the use of gene editing for biomedical
enhancement in any sort of interesting way is not just technically far off, it involves a different
kind of use of gene editing than is currently being pursued in research. Any use of gene editing to
enhance our physical or psychological characteristics would likely involve affecting the
developmental pathways for these traits in completely different ways than researchers are
currently exploring. Second, and more importantly, there are significant questions about future
clinical use even for very clearly therapeutic uses of germline gene editing. I will focus on one in
depth: determining rationale for germline gene editing in cases where there are competing
therapeutic options.
None of this is to say that enhancement will never be possible, nor is it to say that it is
something we should not discuss. Rather, the conclusion to draw from this argument is that,
when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical
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context—germline intervention in reproductive medicine—issues about enhancement and
eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, likely a red herring. Current research is taking us in a
different direction, and discussions about the ethics of enhancement are of limited use in the
place we appear to be headed. Arguing about enhancement is of little relevance to the issues we
are likely to encounter there, and there are more pressing (and unresolved) questions that need
attention if the clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility.
In sections 2 and 3, I will argue for these two reasons to move beyond worries about
enhancement in the ethics of gene editing. In section 4, I will consider two alternatives to sorting
uses of gene editing into “therapies” and “enhancements” for settling permissibility of, and
guidelines for, future clinical use, before a brief conclusion in section 5.

2. On the Site of Gene Editing
The possibility of using gene editing on human beings to control our biology at the fundamental
level has been a topic of intense discussion since the introduction of recombinant DNA
techniques. Most of this discussion has been speculative, in the sense that it was based on
speculation about what shape the application of gene editing technology to human beings would
take. Over the past few years, this situation has changed. Several gene therapies8 for the
treatment of diseases such as acute lymphoblastic leukemia and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma have
been introduced into clinical use in the United States,9 and there have been significant
developments in research on germline gene editing (GGE).10 The debate about use of GGE in
humans is no longer speculative; we can, now, begin to get a sense of what a clinical application
of GGE in humans could look like.
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One thing that is clear about the shape of GGE research is that it is different from the sort
of editing that is likely to be needed in order to achieve the kinds of biomedical enhancement
bioethicists fret about. Consider one of the most high profile research results to date,11 in which a
team at Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) used the CRISPR gene editing system to
target and cleave a mutated MYBPC3 gene in human embryos.12 The particular mutation they
were after is the cause of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a disease that causes weakness
(myopathy) in cardiac muscle. It is a monogenic, autosomal dominant disorder, meaning a child
has to inherit only one mutated allele of the gene in order to develop the disease; individuals who
are heterozygous for the mutated allele will still have the disease.13 The team at OHSU used the
CRISPR gene editing system to target the mutated MYBPC3 gene by introducing the system into
an oocyte simultaneously with fertilization by sperm via intracytoplasmic sperm injection
(ICSI).14 Through homology directed repair, the fertilized zygotes then replaced the cleaved gene
with a healthy version of MYBPC3, thus resulting in zygotes that were homozygous for two
healthy “wild type” MYBPC3 genes.15
The experiment was a huge step forward. The first attempt to use CRISPR on human
embryos in 2015 resulted in a large rate of off-target effects and mosaicism in the edited
embryos.16 By contrast, the recent experiment by the OHSU team showed dramatic reduction in
off-target effects, and a larger batch of zygotes that showed no detectible abnormalities. This is a
dramatic step toward potential clinical use of GGE, and in a very short period of time. However,
the team at OHSU used CRISPR to target only a single small mutation in one gene—in this case,
a four base pair deletion in MYBPC3.17 The team was able to remove the mutation and induce the
embryos to repair the deletion so the stretch of DNA on one chromosome matched the stretch on
the other. Interestingly and very importantly, the team was unsuccessful in getting induced
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pluripotent stem cells (IPSCs) to take up synthetic DNA in place of the cleaved mutation; the
rates of successful editing were extraordinarily low.18 Only when CRISPR was introduced
simultaneously with fertilization via ICSI were the embryos able to repair themselves. So, this
important experimental advance in human gene editing involved the use of CRISPR to target and
cleave a four base pair deletion in one copy of one gene, and induce embryos to repair
themselves so that the copy of the gene on one chromosome matched the “wild type” present in
the population at large, and on the embryo’s other chromosome. To give a sense of the difference
in magnitude in genetic causes of disease: there may be as many as forty one loci involved in risk
for Parkinson’s Disease, and the causal pathways from these genes to development of the disease
are largely unknown.19 Nevertheless, this is a very impressive result; by using CRISPR to repair
a small defect in these embryos, the team showed that gene editing can be used to cure, and
potentially remove from a family lineage forever, a fatal genetic mutation.20
It is, however, different in kind from the use of CRISPR or any other gene editing
technique to “enhance” compex traits like intelligence. The issue is not that current gene editing
tools aren’t sophisticated or powerful enough; the issue is that applications currently being
pursued are very different from anything like enhancement. Complex traits like intelligence
(assuming, for the sake of argument, they have a very strong genetic basis in the first place) are
almost certainly the result of large numbers of genes working in concert over the course of
development, potentially deep into an individual’s life. Research in genetics and developmental
biology raises a number of problems with the very idea that complex traits can be affected by
edits to single, or even small packages, of genes.21 There does not appear to be any, or at least
many, ‘magic switch’ genes that are involved in the development of traits such as language use
or other important cognitive skills.22 These traits are the result of large numbers of genes, and so
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any editing will have to involve making multiple changes. Current research into GGE in humans,
on the other hand, involves targeting single genes that are heavily causally implicated in the
etiology of a set of genetic diseases (monogenic, autosomal, inherited genetic disorders).
Applications of GGE currently being explored simply do not involve the kind of editing that
would be required for affecting complex physiological and psychological traits.
Second, complex traits are not just the result of large numbers of genes, but rather of
patterns of expression over the course of development. Depending on the trait, expression is
affected not only by conditions in utero, but exogenous factors of a dizzying variety. All of the
interesting human traits that bioethicists fret about “enhancing” are the result of complex
developmental and molecular pathways involving multiple genes, precisely orchestrated patterns
of expression, and multiple epigenetic mechanisms. For this reason, many philosophers of
biology argue that it is better to think of the relevant causal units here as “developmental
pathways”—packages of genes, epigenetic mechanisms, and patterns of expression, that are
canalized to varying degrees.23 Gene editing techniques like CRISPR can be used to affect gene
expression in simpler model organisms;24 in humans, such moves have not even been tried, and
given restrictions on embryo and stem cell research, may not be tried any time in the foreseeable
future (or ever).
I do not mean to suggest here anything about, to use the old-fashioned terms, the relative
value of ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’; nor do I mean to make claims about the scientific or technical
possibilities of enhancement. GGE research (along with research on early human development,
generally) will surely yield better understanding of the pathways from genes to traits, as
manipulating genes to see how this changes the developmental pathways for different pathogenic
traits is an excellent way to learn more about genetic causation.25 This is something that gene
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editing in model organisms has shown in developmental biology research.26 It is very possible
that one day scientists can build on all this research to see how developmental pathways for
complex traits can be manipulated in vivo, and biomedical enhancement may become a technical
possibility. We cannot wish away the general hard questions about enhancement and eugenics,
and I do not mean to argue that they should be ignored.
What I do mean to argue here is that the two differences discussed above show that the
current state of reseach on GGE involves a difference in kind, not just in degree of technical
sophistication, from the use of GGE for biomedical enhancement. Use of GGE in enhancement
involves targeting multiple genes, and influencing expression over the course of development,
and potentially even deep into an individual’s life span. By contrast, current research on GGE is
focused on techniques for making edits to pathogenic mutations in single genes that are heavily
causally implicated in development of specific diseases. The experiment discussed in this section
involves investigating whether CRISPR—a highly useful research tool in the life sciences—can
be adapted for clinical uses in human beings. It is wrong to assume that translation of the
technique for one kind of clinical application is either the same as, or at least strongly connected
to, other (currently speculative) potential uses.27 Use of gene editing for biomedical enhancement
will involve making multiple edits, using the technology to influence gene expression, and will
in many cases have to involve swapping of pieces of DNA with synthetic DNA (something that,
as the OHSU experiment showed, is still not technically feasible in human embryos). This is a
different application of gene editing technology altogether from repair of pathogenic mutations.
Another way to think of this is in terms of implementation. In a commentary on an article
about moral enhancement in a special issue of this journal on gene editing, Nicholas Agar noted
that there are two levels of questions about enhancement. One is about whether it should be done
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at all: whether biomedical enhancement is ever permissible, and if so what uses of it would be
justifiable. A second level concerns what he calls “implementation problems,” which includes
questions about what technologies should be used to achieve enhancement goals, how they
should be distributed, and whether they are likely to have the intended effects (and not, for
instance, a slew of unintended consequences).28 Suppose we did consider biomedical
enhancement permissible, and considered GGE a feasible and morally permissible way to
achieve this. If so, the kind of editing that is the focus of current research would fail as a means
of implementing our enhancement goals. We likely could not effect changes to traits such as
intelligence by making small edits to single genes. This is a different kind of editing than what is
necessary to implement the sorts of biomedical enhancement bioethicists typically discuss.
There is an important caveat to all of this. Though it may not be possible to affect
complex cognitive traits, it may be possible to create propensities for developing enhanced
versions of more fine-grained traits through small edits. A good example of this is the previously
mentioned (see note 11) controversial use of CRISPR to edit the CCR5 gene in two twin girls
carried out in 2018 by He Jiankui. CCR5 is believed to be involved in memory; lab mice with the
CCR5 deletion He induced in the twin girls perform better in experiments to test memory than
other mice, and CCR5 is implicated in quicker recovery from stroke in humans.29 There is no
conclusive evidence, but there is enough to suggest—emphasis on suggest—that editing of this
one gene could impact neural development and memory.
Cases such as this show that successful regulation of the kinds of clinical applications
being pursued require drawing very fine grained lines of permissibility. We need to consider not
just specific clinical applications and their goals, but also specific targets. This may look like an
impossible task, but it is not, and in fact, as I will argue in section 4, is much more conceptually
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tractable than trying to sort applications into “therapies” and “enhancements” and drawing a bold
line between these two categories. This sort of case also illustrates the unique neuroethics issues
raised by GGE, as it shows the extra stakes involved with any editing that could effect neural
development. Quite apart from whether editing CCR5 can boost memory, there is enough
evidence to suggest that it could have some effect on neural development. Targeting the gene for
one particular purpose—in this case, inducing immunity to HIV infection—could have a
significant set of unintended effects on the girls’ cognitive traits and psychological makeup.30
There are then an important set of questions in neuroethics about what sorts of impacts on neural
development and cognitive traits would be permissible, what sorts would raise the risks of GGE
beyond acceptable levels, and what these impacts would mean for the resulting persons, that
have significant bearing on the ethics of GGE.
Cases like the CCR5 editing case look like they pose a significant problem for the line of
argument pursued above. The CCR5 editing case seems to show that any kind of GGE, even its
use to correct pathogenic mutations in single genes, inevitably opens the door to more
controversial uses of gene editing, and shows why germline intervention of any kind crosses an
ethical red line—an ethical and psychological barrier that, once crossed, introduces new
possibilities and changes the probabilities of all sorts of uses of gene editing in the future.31
This is an old argument, and has been deployed in different forms against different
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and research using embryos and embryonic stem
cells.32 The argument depends on a significant hidden premise: that we could not draw more finegrained lines between different germline interventions, permitting some but not others. This
premise in turn depends on a suspect conceptual move: lumping all germline interventions
together into a single category, regardless of their respective technical details and clinical goals.
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The discussion in this section shows why this is mistaken. We were easily able to make a
threefold distinction between edits to single genes to correct a pathogenic mutation, edits to
single genes to induce a propensity for a better-than-baseline cognitive trait, and edits to multiple
genes to impact complex traits. There is no reason why regulation of GGE could not permit the
first but forbid the second and third (in section 4, I will propose exactly this).
Another response is that we cannot take our cues about what ethical issues are important
from the current state of a technology; given how rapidly research on gene editing is progressing,
this above picture of the current state of the art could well be outdated in the future. (Depending
on when you are reading this article, maybe it already is!) This is partly true; just because some
forseeable use of a technology is not proximate in time does not mean it is not important, or is
not important enough to subject to ethical scrutiny. However, though ethical issues about
technological changes that are nearer to us in time may not have more importance than those that
are farther off, they may have more urgency. In considering the ethics of a new technology,
priority may need to be assigned to uses of technology that are closer in time than those that are
farther off, even if the farther off uses are equally or more significant. Consider: the development
of a fully intelligent artificial agent may be a far more significant advance in AI technology than
better facial recognition technology or more efficient autonomous driving programs, but the
urgency of ethical issues about the latter (use of facial recognition technology by governments in
law enforcement, for instance, or wholesale shifts in transportation to autonomous vehicles) may
require us to assign them greater priority in considering the overall moral geography.
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3. Beyond ‘Therapy’ and ‘Enhancement’
Even though the kind of editing discussed above would likely fail as a path toward biomedical
enhancement (with the caveat of cases such as “dual use” editing of genes like CCR5), there are
still very serious ethical issues about how it could, or should, be used. A legacy of the intense
focus on enhancement in the ethics of gene editing is that the line between therapeutic and
enhancing uses of gene editing is treated as very relevant. The difference between a therapeutic
application and one that aims at enhancement is supposed to be a very consequential one.33 There
are, however, serious ethical issues with even very clearly therapeutic uses of GGE, and
classifying applications of GGE as therapeutic and delineating them from enhancements does
little to alleviate them.
There is a huge literature on the therapy/enhancement distinction in medicine. The
problems with drawing the distinction clearly are well known, and the ground is well trodden.34 I
am not going to rehearse the main arguments or the well-known difficulties with the distinction
here. For purposes of the following argument, we can assume that these problems have all been
solved. Even if we had a clear therapy/enhancement distinction, this would do little to shed light
on some very difficult problems regarding therapeutic uses of GGE. Consider the following
situation. Suppose we are at the point where we can use GGE to, as in the OHSU team’s
experiment, correct small pathogenic mutations. A treatment for, say, beta thalassemia is
developed that involves making precise corrections at the point of fertliziation of an oocyte via
ICSI.35 But, at the same time, a gene therapy for beta thalassemia has also been developed, a
medical goal which is actively being pursued today.36 Let us also suppose the treatment is
effective and safe early in life, so that the individuals involved can, with either treatment, live the
bulk of their lives (ceteris paribus) free from beta thalassemia. For individuals who carry the
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gene, with a family history of beta thalassemia, there are thus two different treatment options
(assume, for the sake of argument, we have ruled out the relatively “low tech” options of
adoption and use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis). One is to bring a pregnancy to term, see
if the child has the condition or is free of disease, and if the child has beta thalassemia, to treat it
through gene therapy. Another is GGE—to make edits to the gene at the point of conception, and
use only those zygotes free of the mutation to create a pregnancy, thus ensuring the child is free
of disease.
There are two questions here. One is a clinical question: how do we determine which is
the better therapeutic option?37 This is not an ethical question in and of itself, but it does involve
at least some weighing of harms and benefits. The second though is an ethical question: if both
of these treatments are available, does this affect the permissibility of using GGE? Given the
higher general risks (at least early in its potential clinical use) of GGE as opposed to somatic
gene editing, and given background concerns about opening the door to other, less clearly
therapeutic uses of gene editing, we may think that absent any compelling reason to prefer it to
alternative therapies, editing at the germline should not be permissible.
In this hypothetical case there is, however, one significant clinical benefit that germline
gene editing has over gene therapy: fixing the mutated HBB gene that causes beta thalassemia
could potentially wipe it out of the subject’s family lineage, as editing at the germline means the
fixed gene will be present in all the individual’s cells, including gametes, and so will be heritable.
A gene therapy used in infancy will only treat the disease in this particular individual. The
heritability of changes to the genome of an individual at the germline is the source of a great deal
of ethical consternation.38 But paradoxically the heritability of changes at the germline is also a
significant clinical benefit over other treatments for the same disease. It not only removes the
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disease from the next generation, but decreases risks to future generations through future
reproductive choices, and removes a significant dark cloud hanging over the reproductive
choices for successive generations—or in other words, the children and grandchildren of those
opting for GGE never have to go through the same difficult and expensive decisionmaking
process.39
As Soren Holm points out, in his contribution to a special issue of this journal on gene
editing, the use of GGE to affect the creation and constitution of future persons raises a number
of questions.40 First, risks to the child from the gene therapy are, to a large degree at least, known
and quantifiable. Risks to the child (and future generations), in this hypothetical example of the
first use of GGE, will not be. Second, some of these risks are caused by the very thing that makes
GGE a potential benefit over gene therapy—the heritability of the change to the child’s genome.
The risks of making heritable changes have to be weighed against the potential benefits of
making nonheritable changes through a gene therapy. And third, opting for gene therapy
involves imposing risk on an existing person, whereas GGE will involve risks for a potential
person.41 The already existing child has a baseline set of risks and expectations resulting from
their disease, against which we can weigh the harms and benefits of gene therapy. The potential
child has no such baseline—they will be born with whatever risks are induced through the gene
editing process built into their physical makeup. It is not clear what the relevant comparison class
is for settling risks versus benefits for the potential, edited child. The natural comparison class
would seem to be those born with beta thalassemia who have to undergo gene therapy.
But a case could be made here that the right class is the population at large. Any child at
all will be born with such built in risks. Do risks introduced via the editing process depart
significantly from those for a representative child (with a family history, say, of heart disease, or
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parents who smoke, and/or a myriad of other risk factors)? If the answer is no (emphasis on if),
then GGE seems to offer a much better option over gene therapy: the risk to the potential child is
much higher with the latter than the former. This is, paradoxically, the case even if the risks of
GGE are higher than those from the gene therapy. The latter set of risks involve the imposition
of harms on a child, whereas the former do not—the child is simply born with a biological
property (being an edited subject) that introduces a set of risks that are not significantly different
than the biological properties that introduce risks to any of us (having a family history of
diabetes, or alcoholism, and so on). Or to put it differently, even if GGE is riskier than gene
therapy in this case, bringing an edited subject into the world involves no more harm to them
than bringing a child into the world at all, whereas bringing a child into the world with beta
thalassemia and then putting them through a process of gene therapy involves two factors
(having beta thalassemia, going through gene therapy) that involve significant departures from
the average level of risk. If this line of argument goes through, then, as Holm notes, “...almost no
uses of genetic modification in reproduction can be deemed as unsafe.”42 The relevant
comparison class here, then, matters a great deal.
These are tricky ethical calculations. But crucially—they have little to nothing to do with
enhancement. The use of GGE in this hypothetical scenario is an unquestionably therapeutic use,
and any ethical considerations about the distinction between therapeutic and enhancing uses of
GGE is of little relevance for this clinical application. The complications in this case stem from
the particulars of GGE (that it involves making heritable changes to embryos that could become
future people). These are questions, then, specifically about clinical uses of GGE, that require us
to move beyond worries about ‘therapy’ versus ‘enhancement.’ These are also questions that
weigh heavily on current ethical issues about GGE research. If it is true that, in our future
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scenario, the existence of the gene therapy cancels out any justification for GGE, then we may
think that it is better to invest resources into research for gene therapies for these diseases instead
of the (ethically more controversial) option of editing at the germline.43

4. Ethics for GGE Where the Action Is
Instead of sorting different uses of GGE into broad categories like ‘therapies’ and
‘enhancements,’ and treating any use of GGE as crossing an ethical red line that automatically
introduces the possibility of the latter, it is better to focus attention where the action is: the
specific techniques and targets themselves.44 The experiment described above in section 2
involved correcting a genetic abnormality that causes disease. The editing in this case resulted in
an embryo that had two healthy alleles of a common gene. It involved, in other words, restoring
the mutated allele to a healthy “wild type” version present in the human population. This is
different from inducing a change in what would be an otherwise healthy embryo (which is what
He Jiankui did, in the case discussed in section 2), or in introducing a gene via transfer of
synthetic DNA that an embryo would not otherwise carry. Correcting a genetic abnormality is
something that is perfectly permissible in adults (through somatic gene editing). The ethical
issues that arise from it have to do with editing at the germline, not with the editing itself. This is
not the case with inducing changes to otherwise healthy individuals or in introducing novel genes,
which may well be impermissible no matter what.45
This looks very much like a good place to draw an initial line. There are still many
significant philosophical questions here: What is the difference between an otherwise healthy
embryo and one that has an ‘unhealthy’ abnormality? What would be the difference between
correcting an abnormality that causes a disease, and one that creates a propensity for a chronic
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disease? What is a ‘wild type’ gene, and how does it differ from a novel or synthetic gene? What
is the difference between correcting a genetic abnormality and inducing a change? Nevertheless,
these are at least somewhat tractable because of their specificity. We can consider what
genotypes are pathogenic or which changes result in an abnormal genotype by comparison with
the population as a whole, instead of debating about what counts as ‘normal’ and
‘pathological.’46
Another possibility is to draw the line at edits to one gene. Editing single genes, as the
initial research has shown, has many potential clinical uses. But there is only so much that you
can do to affect phenotypes with edits to single genes. Drawing the line at single gene edits
makes it virtually impossible to do many of the things with GGE that many bioethicists (and
people, generally) find objectionable (again, with some caveats). It is also the case that single
gene edits have a drastically lower threshold of risk than multiple gene edits. There are large, and
still not completely defined, risks to editing single genes. But once you start editing multiple
genes, you not only have to worry about adding risks from multiple different edits, you also have
to worry about intragenic effects, and so the risk not only is additive, it is compounded. Given
the current state of gene editing technology, it is hard to see multiple gene edits in human
embryos being a safe and effective clinical possibility in the foreseeable future, so the de facto
line of permissible use of gene editing will be drawn at single gene edits anyway.
Both of these are perfectly serviceable as conditions on permissibility for future clinical
uses of GGE. Should GGE become a real possibility, guidelines for use will be necessary. These
will be important for a number of reasons: they will make it clear to the public and to patients
what the technology can be used for, they will set clear boundaries to hold providers accountable
and determine what is and is not an abuse or an ‘off label’ use, and they will help to mitigate
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risks from more adventurous uses of gene editing until the technology has become more familiar,
and a large body of data on its overall safety and efficacy in reproductive medicine is available.
But they are, also, a significant improvement over simply lumping all germline interventions into
a single category. There are real differences between different uses of GGE. Some of these uses
will appropriately trigger worries about enhancement. Others do not, and breaking out these uses
into different categories allows for a greatly improved understanding of the ethical terrain and
better regulation and governance overall.

5. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that debates about biomedical enhancement are of limited value when
it comes to some potential clinical uses of GGE in the foreseeable future. This is because current
research is of a different kind than research into uses of GGE for biomedical enhancement, and
because there are significant ethical questions for even clearly therapeutic uses of GGE. I have
also made some proposals for intial lines of permissibility for these foreseeable clinical uses.
Regardless of worries about enhancement, the safest bet is that, for better or for worse, research
on GGE in humans will continue, and the world will get closer and closer to the point where its
potential clinical use is a real possibility. Bioethicists should not give up on broader questions
about whether GGE is permissible, or even desirable, and certainly should not stop caring about
biomedical enhancement or the distinction between therapy and enhancement in medicine. But
there is also great need for work on other issues. As I have pointed out at several places in this
paper, there is a particularly relevant role for neuroethics in this discussion, as many important
issues in the ethics of gene editing intersect with issues in neuroethics about altering cognitive
traits through medical interventions.
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A perhaps rosier look at it is this: many technologies were let loose on the world without
sufficient scrutiny, and without reflection on what the right way to use them would be. Right
now there is a great opportunity for all those who study medicine to avoid this situation for what
could be one of the most significant medical innovations in human history. We should continue
to talk about biomedical enhanmcement, and what it means for our notions of dignity, autonomy,
and human nature. But, given the possibility that we may end up in a situation in which gene
editing is done regardless, we also need to talk about how, in such a world, it could be done right.
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